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Summary 
 
In this paper, we analyze the impact of privatization on the firms’ R&D performance. 
We expect that, in the early period after privatization, path dependencies still negatively 
affect the efficiency of R&D operations. We test our hypothesis using a Tobin’s q 
measure and estimating a hedonic model, already adopted by several scholars to assess 
the impact of innovation related assets on the firm’s market value (Griliches, 1981). We 
estimate the regression model on an original panel data of 40 firms, including 20 firms 
privatized through public share offering in different countries of Western Europe over 
the period 1982-1997 that were matched at the country and industry level with 20 
publicly held firms. Our results show that stock markets evaluate R&D investments of 
newly privatized companies less than R&D investments of industry-matched 
companies. 
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Privatization and R&D Performance:  
An Empirical Analysis Based on Tobin’s q 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In different countries, State-owned enterprises have historically played a main role in 
directing and qualifying the evolution of the national innovation systems, both directly, by 
means of their R&D investments and facilities, and indirectly, by means of their procurement 
strategies (Nelson, 1993). Over the last two decades, widespread privatization processes have 
consistently reduced the direct presence of the State as a major player in the economic arena 
(Siniscalco et al., 1999). Prior research on privatization experiences has generally shown that 
the change in ownership improves productive efficiency and profitability at the firm level, 
especially when it coincides with the opening-up of formerly monopolistic markets to 
competition (see Megginson and Netter, 2001, for a review)  
On the contrary, scarce attention has been paid to assessing if and how privatization affects 
the managerial decision to carry on research and development activities, and hence the 
innovative performance of the firm. In general, as Parker (1998) points out, the dynamic 
efficiency gains associated to privatization, regarding investments, research and development 
and innovation, have been largely ignored, both in theory and in practice. 
To this respect, some authors (Shleifer, 1998; Zahra et al. 2000) have argued that private 
ownership must be preferred to public ownership whenever the incentives to innovate and 
contain costs are strong and claimed that privatization processes can have a fundamental role 
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in establishing a new set of organizational dynamics that promote innovation, 
entrepreneurship and the creation of new ventures. However, more recent studies (Katz, 
2001; Munari, 2002; Munari et al., 2002) suggest that the State divestiture can be followed by 
a consistent restructuring and scaling down of R&D facilities and investments of former 
public enterprises, especially when the transfer of ownership is accompanied by the 
contemporaneous liberalization of formerly monopolistic industries, as in the case of public 
utilities. 
In order to shed light on the effects of the State divestiture on the innovative and economic 
performance of newly privatized firms, in this paper we examine the relationship between 
privatization, R&D commitment and market value of the firm. In particular we choose the 
Tobin’s q, that is the ratio between the market value and the replacement cost of the firm’s 
assets, as indicator of the firm’s economic performance. Consistently, in order to estimate the 
impact of R&D investments on the performance of privatized firms, we recall the literature 
that has assessed the relationship between innovation and market value of the firm (see Hall, 
1999 and Oriani and Sobrero, 2002, for a review). 
Therefore, we first integrate at a theoretical level different fields of study concerning the 
economic performance of privatized companies, the impact of corporate governance on 
firms’ innovative efforts and the relationship between knowledge assets and market value of 
the firm, in order to deepen our understanding of the long-run effects of privatizations on 
firms’ innovative performance. To empirically assess the issue, we then adopt a matched-
paired research design and use data from a sample of 40 firms - including 20 privatized firms 
that were coupled at the country and industry level with 20 publicly held firms. The first 
group refers to a set of companies which were privatized through public share offering in 
different countries of Western Europe over the period 1982-1997. We examine in a 
regression framework the relation over time between Tobin’s q and R&D investments for 
privatized and privately owned matched companies, in order to gauge whether significant 
differences emerge between the two groups relatively to the expected contribution of 
knowledge capital to firm’s economic performance. We adopt panel data techniques in our 
analysis to address the problem posed by the unobserved firm heterogeneity. Moreover, we 
deal with the problem of the potential simultaneity between R&D investments and firm’s 
performance by estimating a simultaneous equations regression model.  
Our findings are in line with the theoretical expectations about the existence of 
organizational inertia phenomena which retards the improvements in R&D performance 
within privatized companies. First, the simple descriptive analysis shows that in the early 
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years after the public offer privatized firms reduce the level of R&D investments, while their 
market valuation - expressed by Tobin’s q - rises, although on average it remains lower than 
the one of privately-owned matched companies. Secondly, the results of the regression 
analyses suggest that R&D investments by newly privatized companies are undervalued by 
the stock market compared to our control group. In fact, the relationship between Tobin’s q 
and R&D investments is always positive in the case of private companies, whereas for 
privatized companies the sign of the relation varies in the different estimation models we 
adopt. Moreover, even when the sign is positive for privatized companies, we do find that 
R&D investments appear to have a much larger impact on Tobin’s q in the case of privately-
owned matched firms. We interpret this finding to support the claim of sub-optimal economic 
private returns from R&D resources within SOEs, and the idea that changes in the firm’s 
innovative and economic performance after privatization do not occur instantaneously, but 
require more time to be fully accomplished.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we first provide theoretical 
explanations to justify the expectation of relevant changes in R&D behavior and performance 
after privatization. We then turn to discuss the literature on financial market valuation of the 
firms’ knowledge assets and explain why the market value may result an useful indicator to 
assess the expected economic performance of the firm’s R&D activities after privatization. In 
Section 3 we describe the sample used in the empirical analysis and the technique adopted to 
build the industry-matched control group. Section 4 presents the estimation techniques we 
employ and the results of the different regression analyses. In the final section we draw main 
conclusions from the empirical analysis and discuss the implications for future research. 
 
 
2. Theoretical background  
  
2.1 The impact of privatization on firms’ R&D behavior 
 
Given that R&D projects are typically risky, unpredictable, long-term oriented and 
idiosyncratic (Holmstrom, 1989), they inherently involve high agency costs and thus become 
a potential arena of acute conflicts of interest between executives and shareholders. 
Therefore, the characteristics of the firm’s governance and ownership structure significantly 
influence the undertaking and performance of innovation activities. Empirically, several 
studies have assessed the relationship between firms’ R&D investment decisions and 
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different aspects of their corporate governance system - such as the degree of ownership 
concentration, the presence and role of institutional investors, the composition of the board of 
directors - although reporting mixed results in many senses (see Munari and Sobrero, 2002a, 
for a review of this literature). 
Along this line of inquiry, we focus on the specificities of having the Government as the 
sole or dominant shareholder for R&D investments and on the impact of its divestment after 
privatization on innovation performance at the firm level. Conceptually, it is possible to 
advance two different but interrelated explanations to justify the expectations of consistent 
changes in the firm’s R&D behaviour following privatization (Munari, 2002; Munari et al., 
2002).  
The first argument deals with the different set of objectives of public and private 
entrerprises: at least theoretically, the attitude towards R&D activities within State-owned 
companies should be more oriented to fulfil general national goals of generating and 
diffusing the public good of knowledge rather than exclusively addressing business specific 
objectives, given the wider mission of maximizing social welfare. On the other hand, after the 
divestiture of the State, the privatized firm has no more implicit or explicit obligation to act in 
the interest of the public welfare or of the overall industry. This should push the management 
to reconsider the scope of R&D projects undertaken, by focusing on those most closely 
linked to the needs of the core business. 
Secondly, if we relax the rather “heroic” assumption that SOEs seek to maximize public 
interest and recall the arguments of public choice theory (Niskanen, 1971; Buchanan, 1972), 
and property rights theory (De Alessi, 1987; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988) a possible  reduction 
of resources devoted to R&D after privatization may be rather ascribed to efficiency gains 
and to the elimination of wastes and duplication of resources characterizing the company 
under State ownership. Privatization produces an increased alignment of managerial 
incentives with firm financial performance, ultimately promoting a more efficient use of 
resources, which is likely to characterize the management of innovation activities as well. 
Indeed, most of the studies on the economic consequences of privatization generally show 
consistent efficiency gains and improvements in productivity after the divestiture of the State 
(La Porta and Lopez de Silanes, 1997; Megginson et al., 1994; D’Souza and Megginson, 
1999; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). 
Ultimately, these two different explanations converge in theoretically supporting the 
expectations of a reduction in R&D investments level after the State divestiture. Recent 
empirical evidence seems to reinforce this view. Using data from privatization experiences 
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undertaken in the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy and France, Munari et al. (2002) and Munari 
(2002) document that privatization represents a significant break in the way R&D activities 
are considered and managed. The most striking effect highlighted regards a substantial 
restructuring and scaling-down of R&D facilities after privatization, which follows the 
change in their mission towards a more direct contribution to the creation of value for the 
company and the new private shareholders. In an analysis of the national innovation systems 
of Brasil, Argentina and Chile, Katz (2001) reports that the widespread privatization and 
liberalization programs undertaken during the 90s in those countries dramatically reduced the 
size of R&D facilities of privatized companies, and in some cases lead to their dismissal.  
An econometric analysis based on a sample of 37 companies privatized through public 
share offering in Western European countries in the period 1980-1997 shows that, after 
controlling for inter-industry differences, privatization processes negatively affect different 
measures of R&D commitment (Munari and Sobrero, 2002b). Moreover, the same study 
documents a significant increase in the number of patents assigned to the companies of the 
sample following privatization. However, this increase in the propensity to patent does not 
impact negatively on the average patent quality, as measured by the number of citations 
received by following patents2. 
 
2.2. The impact of privatization on firms’ innovative performance 
 
Indeed, R&D expenditures, and somehow patents as well, are essentially “input” rather 
than “output” measures of innovative activity. Therefore, previous evidences on the dynamics 
of R&D investments and patenting activity do not fully address the question of whether 
privatization effectively impacts on the innovative and long-term economic performance of 
the company.  
Building on the above mentioned considerations, we should expect privatization to be 
associated with higher private economic gains stemming from R&D activities. Following the 
State divestiture, the firm not only could focus on those R&D activities more important and 
useful for its own business needs (for instance by abandoning or outsourcing those activities 
more directly linked to the interest of public welfare), but it should also be able to manage its 
R&D resources in a more efficient way. These two different lines of reasoning lead to 
opposite conclusions about the possible consequences of privatization for social welfare in 
                                                 
2
 The degree to which this measure assesses the quality and the technological importance of a patent is broadly 
discussed in Hall et al. (2000). 
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the long run, but converge in suggesting that the private economic returns stemming from 
innovative activities are likely to increase after the divestment of the State. 
Moreover, the change in ownership fosters a greater entrepreneurial orientation in the 
recognition and exploitation of business opportunities (Frydman et al., 1998; Zahra et al., 
2000). Consequently, the issues of the valorization and exploitation of the technological 
capital become major concerns after privatization, and several organizational solutions 
targeted to improve their effectiveness are typically undertaken as suggested by the observed 
increase in patent productivity (Munari, 2002). In summary, we should expect that, ceteris 
paribus, any currency unit invested in R&D by the privatized company should generate 
higher expected economic results in comparison to what happened under the State ownership.  
Indeed, a major drawback of the economic literature on the consequences of the State 
divestment resides in the fact that privatization is usually interpreted as a discrete event, and 
in the underlying assumption that it should immediately lead to better economic performance. 
On the contrary, the organizational change processes induced by the transfer of ownership 
from the State to the market, which are far from being immediate and smooth, have been 
largely unexplored in the literature (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000).  
A first important contribution of looking at the microprocesses of organizational change in 
the study of privatization derives from the observation that organizations do not adapt 
instantaneously to a different institutional and competitive context, but are characterized by 
substantial inertia and are slow to change (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hannan and Freeman, 
1984). Firms develop through an incremental process of recombination of their existing 
resources and capabilities that is highly dependent on initial conditions (Kogut and Zander, 
1992). Early stages of privatization are thus typically still characterized by residual 
conformity to public sectors norms and routines, even though they increasingly prove to be 
obsolete and unfit as a source of competitive advantage in the new environment. In such 
circumstances, both from an institutional and individual point of view, there is a search for a 
new identity and new rules, and two different templates, the old public sector one and the 
new private sector one, still coexist. The adoption of a private sector template thus does not 
take place at a point in time, but through an incremental and progressive process of 
experimentation (Johnson et al., 2000).  
With specific regard to the case of R&D activities, the above mentioned considerations 
suggest that in the early period following privatization path dependencies may still negatively 
affect the efficiency of R&D operations. Thus, if we assume that the private returns to R&D 
investments of SOEs are sub-optimal and that changes in their productivity tend to be 
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difficult and gradual,  the expected positive effect of privatization on innovation performance 
might not fully materialize at least in the short term. However, the returns to R&D activities 
are likely to gradually increase over time, as the efficiency pressures brought by private 
ownership diffuse and establish through the organization 
 
2.3. Tobin’s q and the assessment of R&D performance in newly privatized firms 
 
The market value of the firm can be an useful indicator to assess the expected economic 
performance of the firm’s R&D activities after privatization for at least two reasons. First, 
market value is a forward-looking measure expressing the stock market expectations about 
firms’ future performance. Second, previous empirical literature has already shown that it is 
possible to assess the specific effect of different technology-related assets on the market 
value of the firm (Hall, 1999).  
The Tobin’s q, in particular, has the advantage to be a ratio between financial price data 
and accounting data. Thus, it allows comparisons between outputs, measured by the market 
valuation of the firm, and inputs, measured by the replacement cost of the firm’s assets 
(Lindenberg and Ross, 1981). Tobin’s q has then some particularly attractive theoretical 
properties for empirical analysis: it implicitly uses the correct cash flow risk-adjusted 
discounted rate, imputes equilibrium returns and minimizes distortions due to tax laws and 
accounting standards (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988). 
Tobin’s q increases, ceteris paribus, with the expected streams of extra profits stemming 
from firm-specific Ricardian rents (Lindenberg and Ross, 1981), because its denominator is 
the market value of the firm, that in efficient stock markets is equal to the discounted value of 
firm’s present and future cash flows. However, even in absence of market power, Tobin’s q  
can exceed the unity because of measurement problems affecting the book value of firm’s 
assets. In particular, as corporate reports provide very poor information on the intangible 
assets, in practice Tobin’s q is often calculated as the ratio of the market value of the firm to 
the book value of its tangible assets, even though the growing importance of intangible assets 
in the firm’s value is broadly recognized. For example, R&D investments are not normally 
capitalized, but are expensed to P&L accounts when incurred, so that they do not concur to 
the book value of the firm’s assets (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996). This implies that, ceteris 
paribus, Tobin’s q is higher when R&D-related intangibles become a larger fraction of the 
firm’s total assets.  
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These considerations can be fruitfully applied to the analysis of innovation performance of 
newly privatized firms. In fact, as already discussed, newly privatized firms tend to reduce 
their efforts in R&D activity after the public offer, so that, ceteris paribus, we could expect a 
decrease in their Tobin’s q. However, according to previous arguments, after privatization 
both a rise in productivity and a new focus on business opportunities could increase the 
expected rents from the R&D activities, so that the net effect on Tobin’s q is uncertain.  
Tobin’s q can then be used as a measure of expected performance to assess the private 
returns to innovation of newly privatized firms. Unfortunately, data on market value are not 
available before the privatization, and hence pre- and post-privatization comparisons are not 
feasible. However, it is possible to analyze the impact of R&D investments on Tobin’s q of 
privatized firms in comparison to a sample of publicly-held firms. This is the strategy we will 
follow in this paper. In line with previous reasoning, because of considerable lags between 
the changes in corporate governance structure and changes in R&D effectiveness and 
profitability, we expect to observe an initial difference in the market valuation of R&D 
investments of privatized and comparable publicly-held firms that should progressively 
disappear over time.  
 
2.4 Endogeneity issues 
 
 
In the analysis of the relationship between R&D investments and Tobin’s q of privatized 
firms, R&D investments can not be treated as an exogenous variable for two main reasons. 
First, since R&D is chosen on the basis of economic incentives, it is unlikely that it is 
independent from firm’s market valuation (Griliches, 1995). In fact, previous empirical 
literature has shown that R&D investments depend on firm’s economic and financial 
performance (Blundell et al. 1992; Hall et al., 1999; Bond and Cummins, 2001). This issue 
creates confusion on the causality direction between R&D investments and Tobin’s q. 
Previous empirical work has already recognized this potential issue and has treated R&D 
investments as an endogeneous variable  (i.e., Jaffe, 1986).  
Second, both Tobin’s q and R&D investments are likely to be endogenously determined by 
the exogenous changes in corporate governance led by the firm’s privatization process. 
Empirical literature has shown that privatization positively affects different measures of 
firm’s performance, such as profits (D’Souza and Megginson, 1999; Bortolotti et al., 2002), 
stock returns (Megginson, 2000; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001) and Tobin’s q (Claessens et 
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al., 1997). At the same time, it has been shown that R&D investments decrease over time 
after privatization (Munari and Sobrero, 2002b; Munari et al., 2002). To the extent that this 
endogeneity issue exists, a problem of simultaneity between R&D investments and Tobin’s q 
arises. In this case, a pooled OLS estimator would lead to inconsistent coefficients.  
In this paper, we will address these questions treating R&D investments as endogeneous 
within a simultaneous equations model. 
 
 
3. Data 
 
3.1 Sample 
 
We created an original dataset including R&D expenditures and accounting and stock 
market information for a matched-paired sample of privatized and publicly held companies. 
We started our data collection with a sample taken from two articles by Megginson et al. 
(1994) and D’Souza and Megginson (1999), including 174 companies, operating in 35 
different industries, that were fully or partially privatized worldwide through public share 
offering in 32 countries between 1980 and 1997. Following Megginson et al. (1994), our 
definition of privatization includes any measure that transfers some or all of the ownership 
and/or control over SOE to the private sector. We decided to consider only companies 
privatized through public sale, in order to control for information asymmetries, which might 
be generated by private solicitation processes and could not be controlled effectively.  
We further integrated this initial sample with information on privatization processes 
derived from: (1) the complete list of companies privatized worldwide in the 80s compiled by 
the World Bank (Candoy-Seske, 1988); (2) the description of privatization programs adopted 
by the countries of the European Union provided by Parker (1998); (3) additional information 
taken from business journals and publications reported in the archive Lexis-Nexis. The final 
sample we were able to draw up after this initial phase included 182 firms from 32 countries. 
We then decided to limit our analysis only to firms which were privatized in Western 
European countries for several reasons. First, the vast majority of privatization programs that 
occurred worldwide in the period 1977-1997 took place in Western European countries 
(Siniscalco et al., 1999). Second, obtaining information on the key-variables for non Western 
European firms is extremely difficult, especially with regards to data on research and 
development expenditures. Moreover, by considering firms from Western European 
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countries, we were able to collect data at country and industry level as well, using the OECD 
official statistics, as we describe later on. 
We then identified all the R&D performing firms in Western European countries from the 
initial sample, and kept only those reporting R&D expenditures in their financial statements 
in the period. We then decided to drop the public utilities (telecommunications, energy and 
water services) from this intermediate sample, because, as these firms typically operated 
under a monopolistic regime, it was not possible to accurately match them at country and 
industry level. After cleaning the initial sample by following these criteria, we were left with 
a final sample of 20 privatized companies operating in 6 Western European countries 
(Finland, France, Germany, Holland, Italy and United Kingdom) and 10 different 
manufacturing industries.  
As a second step, we gathered data for a set of firms that were publicly-traded throughout 
the same time period, in order to constitute a control group. We followed two fundamental 
criteria in our matching process. First, each privatized firm had to be matched with a 
company operating in the same country, in order to take into account possible country-
specific effects in the treatment of R&D expenditures (i.e. the existence of fiscal incentives or 
legal differences in the capitalization and disclosure of R&D expenditures) and market 
valuation. Second, we operated an industry-level matching, given that the amount of 
technological opportunities and the incentives to invest in R&D activities consistently vary 
across different sectors (Jaffe, 1986; Cohen and Levin, 1989).  
More precisely, for each privatized firm in our sample we formed a list of all the publicly-
traded R&D-doing firms in the same country and the same industry, classified using the 2-
digit SIC code. From this list, we then chose the company that was more similar to the 
privatized firm with respect to total sales at the year after the public offer and retained it if 
complete data were available for the following years. In the end, we were able to match the 
20 privatized firms of the first group with 20 firms which were privately held throughout the 
same period. The constituents of the two samples are reported in Table 1. 
  
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
 
3.2 Variables 
 
For each firm in both samples we collected data on the main accounting figures and the 
market capitalization for the five years following the public offer. The source of accounting 
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figures, except Italy, is Datastream International, which provides a full coverage of British 
firms and a coverage superior to 75% of the publicly traded companies from other European 
countries. All the accounting data of Italian firms have been gathered from “Centrale dei 
Bilanci”, a broad database including financial statements of about 40.000 Italian companies, 
available at the Research Department of the Bank of Italy. 
Data on R&D expenditures for all the countries have been firstly obtained from Datastream 
International. However, as the disclosure of annual R&D expenditures is compulsory only for 
British firms, this information is not always available for other European companies. For 
firms in these countries we gathered data on R&D expenditures from two more databases: 
Worldscope and Global Vantage.  
We finally gathered the following accounting data: annual R&D investments (RD), other 
intangible assets (I), mainly consisting of trademarks and goodwill, total financial debt (D) 
obtaining by summing up short- and long-term borrowing, net tangible assets (A) and total 
sales (S). The R&D capital (RDC) has been computed as a perpetual inventory of the past 
R&D expenditures with a constant depreciation rate, as described in detail by Griliches and 
Mairesse (1984) and Hall (1990a).  
The total market value (V) should be calculated as the sum of the market capitalization of 
the firm and the market value of its debt. However, the data on the market value of debt are 
often not available. Some of the studies on US samples try to define proxies for the market 
value of debt using data on corporate bond market (see for example Hall, 1990a). This 
solution is not feasible for European samples because of the very limited development of 
corporate bond markets. Therefore, according to previous similar analyses on UK data 
(Blundell et al., 1992, 1999), we calculate the market value of the firm adding the value of 
outstanding debt to market capitalization. 
At industry level, we calculated the R&D intensity for each year and country. This 
measure was computed as the ratio between the R&D investments at 2.digit ISIC code 
reported in the ANBERD database and the 2-digit ISIC code value added reported in the 
STAN database. Both the databases are maintained by OECD and are compatible.   
Variables description and computation is illustrated in detail in Table 2.  
 
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
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4. Model specification 
 
 
According to the theoretical background, in order to compare the R&D performance of 
privatized and publicly held firms, the empirical analysis intends to estimate the impact of the 
R&D investments on the market value of the firm for both samples. To this purpose we recall 
the empirical literature on innovation and market value (Hall, 1999). Some specific 
adjustments will be adopted to deal with the questions related to firm-specific effects and 
endogeneity issues. 
 
4.1 Basic model 
 
Some studies following the seminal contribution of Griliches (1981) have used the Tobin’s 
q to infer the value of the firm’s stock of knowledge (among others Jaffe, 1986; Cockburn 
and Griliches, 1988; Hall, 1993a, 1993b; Blundell et al., 1999; Hall et al., 2000). In these 
analyses, the firm is assumed to be a bundle of independent tangible and intangible assets 
(Hall, 1999). The impact of each specific asset on the market value is the result of the 
interaction between the firms’ demand of funds to finance the investment in that asset and the 
investors’ supply of the funds for that assets (Hall, 1993b). Accordingly, the market value of 
the firm (V) is normally expressed as follows (Hall, 1999): 
 
[1] Vit= b (Ait + γK Kit) 
 
where i denotes firms, t years, A is the book value of net tangible assets, K is firm’s 
knowledge capital. Since the firm’s stock of knowledge is not directly observable and is hard 
to measure, it has been often computed as an R&D-based measure. The main assumption 
made in this perspective is that R&D investments contribute to the generation of an intangible 
capital that is evaluated by the stock market (Griliches, 1981). Consistently with previous 
literature (Cockburn and Griliches, 1988; Hall, 1993a, 1993b), we use two alternative 
measures of K: annual R&D investments (RD) and R&D capital (RDC), that are calculated as 
explained in the previous section. The coefficient b is the market valuation of firm’s assets 
and reflects its differential risk and monopoly position (Griliches, 1981), whereas the 
coefficient γK measures the market valuation of K relative to the tangible capital A. Under the 
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theoretical assumptions of the model, γK depends on the expected impact of knowledge 
capital on the firm’s expected economic performance.  
Scaling both the members of equation [1] by A and taking the natural logs, we obtain the 
following expression: 
 
[2] ( ) ( )ititKitit AKbAV γ++= 1lnlnln  
 
where V/A is a form of Tobin’s q. In most of previous work on this subject, the term 
( )ititK AKγ+1ln  has been approximated by ititK AKγ  (Griliches, 1981; Cockburn e 
Griliches, 1988; Hall, 1993a, 1993b; Blundell et al., 1999), so that the following linear 
regression model where the dependent variable is the natural log of Tobin’s q has been 
derived:  
 
[3]   ( ) itititKititit eAKbAVq ++== γlnlnln  
 
The following set of control variables has been added: 
− I/A 
− D/A  
− ln S 
− year dummies 
− country dummies  
 
 
The ratio I/A appears as explanatory variable to account for eventual differential impacts of 
non R&D-related intangible assets on the firm’s market value. Consistently with the previous 
work of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), the inclusion of the ratio D/A, representing the share 
of firm’s assets financed through debt, serves to capture eventual value enhancing or value 
destroying effects related to the exposure of the firm to interest rate variations in the observed 
period. The natural log of S is included to control eventual size effects on the market value. 
Full sets of year and country dummies are added to account for time and country effects. We 
have initially estimated equation [3] through plain OLS. 
 
4.2 Fixed- and random-effects 
 
The estimation of equation [1] through OLS does not account for the eventual unobserved 
firm-specific heterogeneity νi. Assuming that this component is constant over time, this 
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problem can be eliminated recurring to the fixed-effects estimator, that subtracts the 
individual mean from each variable. The estimator can be expressed in the following way: 
 
[4] ( ) ( ) ( )iitiitiit xxyy εεβ −+−=−  
 
 
where iy  is the individual mean of the dependent variable, ix  is the individual mean of the 
independent variable and iε  is the individual mean of the error term. However, even though 
the fixed-effects estimation accounts for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity, it drastically 
reduces the degrees of freedom. For this reason along with the fixed-effects model, we run a 
random-effects regression, as done by previous studies on similar topics (Bortolotti et al., 
2001, 2002). In this case, the latent variable νi is treated as a random variable with mean ν  
and variance 2νσ . The random-effects estimator is then obtained by computing a ratio θ of the 
relative importance of within and between variation of the total disturbance (νi + εit) and 
using this ratio to combine fixed-effects estimator and between estimator optimally. In 
particular, the expression ( )θ−1  times the individual mean is subtracted from each variable: 
 
[5] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]iitiiitiit xxyy εθενθβθαθθ  1 1 −+−+−+−=−  
 
where θ is a function of the variance of the basic error term 2εσ  and the variance of the 
individual component 2νσ .
3
  
The random-effects is more efficient than fixed-effects estimator because it uses both 
within and between information. However, in order to have consistent results more conditions 
are required for the random-effects than for the fixed-effects estimator. In particular, the 
terms νi and xit must be uncorrelated. In fact, if they were correlated, the estimator could not 
determine how much of a variation of the dependent variable has to be assigned to β or to νi. 
In order to check the assumption of no correlation, we use the Hausman (1978) specification 
test of the null hypothesis that there are no systematic differences between fixed-effects and 
random-effects coefficients. The logic underpinning the test is that fixed-effects estimator is 
consistent under both null and alternative hypothesis, whereas random-effects estimator  is 
                                                 
3
 To compute θ  we refer to the procedure used by TSP for small samples. See Hall and Cummins (1999) for 
details. 
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consistent only under the null hypothesis. Therefore, only in case the null hypothesis can not 
be rejected,  a random-effects specification can be adopted.  
 
 
4.3 Simultaneous equations  
 
To address the potential problem of the eventual simultaneity of R&D investments and 
Tobin’s q, we estimate also a model of simultaneous equations through the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) method, similarly to previous empirical analyses on corporate governance 
and market value (Loderer and Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). The 
first equation is the corporate value equation described by [3] and the second is a linear 
equation of RD or RDC on the following regressors: 
− ln q  
− ln S 
− D/A  
− RDIND 
 
The natural log of Tobin’s q is included to take into account the effect of economic 
incentives to invest in R&D, consistently with previous analyses on the relationship between 
market value and innovation (i.e., Blundell et al., 1992). To control for scale effects in R&D 
investments, we consider the firm’s size in any give year as measured by the log 
transformation of S. Following the evidence provided by Hall (1990b), which shows a 
negative association between firm’s debt level and R&D investments, we include in the 
model a leverage variable (D/A). The underlying notion views debt financing as inappropriate 
for funding R&D investments, given that servicing a debt typically requires a stable stream of 
cash flows which can be deviated from innovative projects. Finally, we take into account the 
fact that the level of technological opportunities in an industry is an important determinant of 
the managerial decision to invest in R&D (Cohen and Levin, 1989). For these reasons, 
similarly to Lev and Sougiannis (1996), we include the variable RDIND to control for 
industry-, country- and time-specific factors influencing firms’ R&D investments. 
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5. R&D and market value of privatized vs. matched firms: Empirical evidence 
 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation 
 
Descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table 2. They show that privatized 
firms present slightly lower mean values of RD/A, RDC/A and Tobin’s q (respectively .051 
vs. .063, .219 vs. .253 and 1.017 vs. 1.540) and a higher mean value of D/A (.411 vs. 336). 
Furthermore, they are larger than matched firms in terms of average total sales (14,100 vs. 
6,630 millions of Euros)  and total tangible assets (10,500 vs. 3,837 millions of Euros).  
 
---  Insert Table 2 about here --- 
 
 
However, it results more interesting and informative to explore the patterns of RD/A and 
Tobin’s q over time for privatized firms, as reported in Figure 1. To this respect, we first 
focus on the case of privatized companies, and notice that the average RD/A ratio initially 
declines after the public offer, whereas Tobin’s q increases. The valuation of privatized firms 
by the market thus incorporates the positive effects brought by the new ownership and 
governance structure on expected profitability. Moreover, the pattern of Tobin’s q during the 
first two years clearly diverges from the one of RD/A. Thus, the market valuation of  
privatized companies does not seem to respond negatively to the decreasing level of R&D 
activities. On the contrary, the higher value attributed by the market reflects positive 
expectations that the management may be more able to generate profits from the firm’s 
tangible and intangible assets.  
 
---  Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
 
In table 4 we report the correlations among all the variables for the samples of privatized 
and matched firms. No serious problems of multicollineraity seem to emerge. For privatized 
firms there is a high negative and significant correlation between ln S and ln q (-.50), a result 
that may require a more detailed inquiry with respect to the R&D investments equation in the 
simultaneous equations model. In the case of matched firms, I/A is positively correlated RD/A 
and RDC/A (.38 for both variables), suggesting that the two variables might be jointly 
influenced by some exogenous factors. 
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--- Insert Table 4 About here --- 
 
 
5.2 Results 
 
We first estimate equation [3] using pooled OLS. In model (1) we include the ratio RD/A, 
whereas in model (2) we substitute the annual R&D expenditures (RD) with the R&D capital 
(RDC). Table 5 reports the results of the regression on the two different samples. Consistently 
with previous research (Hall, 1999), the regression analysis shows a significant positive effect 
of R&D investments on Tobin’s q, even though the R&D coefficient in model (1) is not 
statistically significant for privatized firms. It is interesting to notice that in the case of 
privatized companies the magnitude of the relation is consistently lower then in the case of 
publicly held matched companies. This result holds for both the estimated models. In model 
(1), the R&D investments coefficient  takes the value of 1.286 for privatized companies and 
7.504, almost six times bigger, for publicly held companies. When we substitute RD with 
RDC in model (2), we have that the coefficient of the R&D capital for publicly held firms 
(1.917) is almost five times bigger than the same coefficient for privatized firms (.386). The 
significantly higher value of the constant for privatized firms (1.985 in model (1) and 1.902 
in model (2)) can be justified by the economic meaning of ln b that, as seen in previous 
section, represents the market valuation of all firm’s assets and is linked to market power. 
Therefore, it is likely that in the early years after the State divestment, privatized firms still 
benefit from a high market power, especially in those industries not immediately opened up 
to competition. The ratios I/A and D/A have a positive impact on Tobin’s q for both the 
samples, but their coefficients are statistically significant only for privatized firms. Finally, it 
has to be remarked that ln S has a negative and significant effect on Tobin’s q, indicating that 
smaller privatized firms have a higher market valuation. 
 
--- Insert Table 5 about here --- 
 
 
In Table 6 we report the fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE) estimations of models 
(1) and (2). As we could expect, FE estimation shows that the stock market places a higher 
valuation on R&D assets of publicly-held firms vs. privatized firms (the coefficients are 
2.524 vs. –1.088 for RD/A and .544 vs. .313 for RDC/A), but never produces statistically 
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significant results with respect to both RD/A and RDC/A. RE estimation also shows a 
difference between market valuation of R&D investments, but in this case the coefficients of 
both RD/A and RDC/A for publicly-held firms are statistically significant, respectively at 5% 
and 10% level. Moreover, in all the models using the RE estimator, the Hausman test does 
not allow to reject the null hypothesis (the p-value is always bigger than .1) suggesting that 
the estimator is admissible.  
 
--- Insert Table 6 about here --- 
 
 
In Table 7 we report the results of the 2SLS estimation of the simultaneous equations 
model where ln q and RD/A in model (1) and RDC/A in model (2) are the endogeneous 
variables. The corporate value equation substantially confirms the results shown in Table 5 
and Table 6. The coefficients of R&D investments are strongly positive and statistically 
significant at 5% level for publicly-held firms (8.795 in model (1) and 2.027 in model (2)), 
whereas they are negative and not significant for privatized firms. The joint estimation of the 
R&D investments equation provides some additional useful insights. With particular respect 
to the leverage D/A, it shows that while it has a negative and significant impact on R&D 
spending for publicly-held firms (the coefficient is -.065 in model (1) and -.270 in model (2)), 
consistently with the traditional argument discussed in the previous section, it has the 
opposite effect for privatized firms, presenting a positive coefficient that is even statistically 
significant in model (2). This finding is coherent with the evidence reported by Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001) showing that privatized firms are more leveraged than publicly held firms 
for two main reasons: the reluctance to issue new equity when they were under the State 
ownership and the existence of implicit or explicit loan guarantees allowing them to borrow 
at favourable rates. Therefore, while in publicly held firms a higher ratio D/A increases the 
external control and consequently reduces the propensity to invest in risky activities such as 
R&D, in privatized firms the debt is more likely to be an important source for R&D 
financing.  
 
--- Insert Table 7 about here --- 
 
 
In summary, the results emerging from the different models strongly support the existence 
of a gap between the stock market valuation of R&D investments of privatized and 
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comparable private firms. In fact, in all the models involving the privately-owned matched 
companies, the coefficients of R&D investments are positive and often significant, in line 
with the general findings of the literature on market value and innovation (Hall, 1999; Oriani 
and Sobrero, 2002). On the contrary, in the case of privatized firms the evidence is less clear, 
since the sign of the relationship is often negative. Moreover, even when the sign is positive, 
the R&D coefficient is never significant (except for model (2) in the pooled OLS estimation) 
and always consistently lower than the correspondent value for privately-owned firms.  
The existence of a low market valuation of R&D investments in the case of privatized 
companies can be explained by the existence of path dependencies which negatively affect 
the R&D performance in the early period after the State divestment. This suggests that the 
private returns generated from R&D activities of formerly publicly-owned enterprises are 
sub-optimal in terms of private returns, and that the improvement brought by private-
ownership might not be immediate as implicitly assumed by the economic literature studying 
the impact of privatization. On the contrary, it is likely that the returns to R&D activities 
gradually increase over time, as the efficiency pressures brought by private ownership diffuse 
through the organization. This would mean that the relation between R&D and Tobin’s q 
should strengthen over time. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have discussed the impact of privatization on the economic returns 
stemming from the firm’s R&D operations. Even though there exists a broad theoretical and 
empirical literature on the effects of privatization on the firm’s economic performance in the 
short term, to our knowledge there are no contributions studying in depth the specific 
implications for the effectiveness of R&D activities. Research into the economics of 
innovation and technological change has shown that the economic growth of firms, industries 
and countries in the long-run is heavily dependent on today’s innovation strategies (Griliches, 
1979; Romer, 1990). For this reason, understanding the impact of privatization processes on 
R&D investments and outcomes should be considered as a relevant issue for both researchers 
and policy-makers, given that in different countries SOEs have played a central role in 
directing and enhancing the development of national innovation system (Nelson, 1993; Katz, 
2001). This paper represents a first step in this direction. 
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We have advanced that the literature on innovation and market value, inspired by the 
seminal contribution of Griliches (1981), can be an useful reference to address the issue of 
R&D performance after privatization. In particular, we have shown how Tobin’s q can allow 
to gauge eventual changes in the expected economic results of R&D investments. Given the 
problems of simultaneity between R&D investments and Tobin’s q, we have estimated a 
simultaneous equations model where also the R&D variable was treated as endogeneous.  
The findings of the regression analyses suggest that R&D investments by newly privatized 
companies seem to be undervalued by the stock market compared to our benchmark of 
publicly held companies. In fact, the relation between Tobin’s q and R&D capital, always 
positive and significant for the privately owned firms used as a control group, is rarely 
significant and sometimes even negative in the case of privatized firms, depending on the 
estimation model adopted. 
Under the assumption of efficient capital markets, our results support the view of low 
private economic returns stemming from R&D activities of formerly publicly-owned 
enterprises, which can be theoretically explained in terms of excess of diversification and low 
productivity level. Our findings show that the beneficial effects brought by privatization on 
innovation activities do not take place overnight, but through a gradual process that can last 
several years, because of the inertia that typically characterizes the organizations and delay 
the adaptation to the new institutional and competitive context. This evidence is consistent 
with qualitative studies that document relevant restructuring processes within the R&D units 
of recently privatized firms and result in a period of high uncertainty and instability at the 
individual and organizational level (Munari, 2002; Munari et al., 2002). 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge this paper’s limitations. A first weakness is related 
to the small number of companies constituting our sample, which is strictly dependent on the 
limited number of privatization programs of relevant size that have occurred worldwide over 
the last twenty years. The possibility of considering larger samples in future research, for 
example by including firms privatized in developing economies, will largely depend on the 
objective difficulties of collecting reliable, publicly-available financial and innovation data 
on international companies.  
A major difficulty in the assessment of firm-level changes in performance after 
privatization is related to the multiplicity of variables that intervene at different levels (firm, 
industry and country) and generate substantial noise around the ownership effect (Cuervo and 
Villalonga, 2000; Ramamurti, 2000). This was our main concern and we tried to control for it 
by adopting a matched-paired research design, as indicated by other works in the literature on 
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the consequences of privatization (Cragg and Dyck, 1999; La Porta and Loperz-de-Silanes, 
1999). 
Then, in our analysis we measured the firm’s commitment to innovative activities by 
means of R&D investments. Further research could adopt alternative innovation measures in 
the market value model, for instance the number of patents assigned, which have been 
demonstrated to correlate more strongly to market valuation when their relative quality is 
considered (Hall et al., 2000). Moreover, we explicitly focused on the impact of privatization 
on the private economic returns to innovation activities, but ignored the issue of the effects in 
terms of social returns. Since the seminal works of Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959), the 
economic literature has highlighted the existence of a relevant gap between the social and the 
private returns to R&D investments, the former being significantly higher expecially in the 
case of fundamental research activities. Assessing the impact of privatization on the long-
term effects of innovation activities for social welfare appears an important and promising 
avenue for future studies, given the role played by SOEs in the technological and economic 
evolution of several industries of both industrialized and developing countries.  
Despite these limitations, we believe that the evidence emerging from this study could 
stimulate new research and help shed light on a topic of great importance for researchers, 
managers and policy makers. 
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Table 1 - Sample firms (privatized vs. matched firms) 
 Privatized firm Matched firm 
IPO year Name Nat Industry  Name Nat Industry  
1985 
 
British 
Aerospace 
UK Aerospace & 
defence 
BBA Group UK Motor Vehicles 
1982 British 
Amersham 
UK Pharma Glaxo UK Pharma 
1986 British Gas UK Gas distribution Burmah 
Castrol 
UK Oil&Gas 
1982 British 
Petroleum 
UK Oil&gas Shell UK Oil&gas 
1988 British Steel UK Primary metal Cookson 
Group 
UK Primary metal 
1987 Rolls Royce UK Aerospace & 
defence 
Westland 
Group 
UK Aerospace & 
defence 
1986 Elf Aquitaine FR Oil&gas Air Liquide FR Chemical 
1986 Saint Gobain FR Stone, clay & glass Valeo  FR Motor Vehicles 
1987 Alcatel-
Alsthom 
FR Electronics & Tlc Schneider FR Electrical 
1993 Rhone-
Poulenc 
FR Pharma L’Oreal FR Soap & 
toiletries 
1995 Pechiney FR Metal products Fives Lille FR Machinery 
1995 Usinor 
Sarcinor 
FR Metal Products Legrand FR Electrical 
1994 Renault FR Motor Vehicles Peugeot FR Motor Vehicles 
1997 Bull FR Computers Compagnie 
des signaux 
FR Electronics & 
Tlc 
1989 DSM  NE Chemical Akzo Nobel NE Chemical 
1994 Kemira FI Chemical Orion FI Pharma 
1994 Outokompu FI Primary metal Partek FI Machinery 
1995 ENI IT Oil&gas Montedison IT Chemical 
1986 Nuovo 
Pignone 
IT Machinery Magneti 
Marelli 
IT Electrical 
1988 Volkswagen DE Motor Vehicles Ford-Werke DE Motor Vehicles 
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Table 2. Variables description 
Variable Definition Calculation  
(Datastream Code in Parentheses) 
V  Total market value of the firm Market capitalization at 12/31 (MV) + 
Loan capital (321) + Short-term 
borrowing (309) 
RD  Annual R&D investments Annual R&D investments (119) 
RDC  R&D capital Perpetual inventory of annual R&D 
expenditures (119)  
A  Book value of net tangible assets Total assets (392) – [Current liabilities 
(389) – Short-term borrowing (309)] – 
Total intangible assets (344)  
I  Book value of other intangible assets Total intangible assets (344)  
D  Total financial debt Loan capital (321) + Short-term 
borrowing (389) 
S  Total sales Total sales (104) 
RDIND  Industry-level R&D intensity  2-digit ISIC annual R&D expenditures/ 
2-digit ISIC output 
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Table 3 - Descriptive statistics for privatized and matched firms 
 Obs Mean Std Deviation Median 
Privatized firms 
S (millions  103 14,100 13,800 9,836 
A (millions  103 10,500 10,200 6,150 
RD / A 103 .051 .045 .027 
RDC / A 103 .219 .189 .125 
I / A 103 .078 .129 .018 
D / A 103 .411 .254 .378 
Tobin’s q 103 1.017 .492 .339 
     
Publicly held firms 
S (millions  103 6,630 8,937 2,256 
A (millions  103 3,837 5,555 1,310 
RD / A 103 .063 .049 .049 
RDC / A 103 .253 .195 .181 
I / A 103 .112 .195 .028 
D / A 103 .336 .221 .332 
Tobin’s q 103 1.540 1.274 .483 
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 Table 4 – Correlations for privatized and matched firms 
 Privatized firms 
 ln q RD/A RDC/A I/A D/A ln S RDIND 
ln q 1.00       
RD/A .23** 1.00      
RDC/A .24** .95*** 1.00     
I/A .15 .07 .10 1.00    
D/A .11 -.05 .00 .08 1.00   
ln S -.50*** -.31*** -.28*** .22** .27*** 1.00  
RDIND .07 .75*** .72*** .07 -.16 -.27*** 1.00 
 Publicly held firms 
 ln q RD/A RDC/A I/A D/A ln S RDIND 
ln q 1.00       
RD/A .36*** 1.00      
RDC/A .32*** .98*** 1.00     
I/A .29*** .38*** .38*** 1.00    
D/A -.03 -.33 -.36*** .15 1.00   
ln S -.01 .10 .10 .12 .23* 1.00  
RDIND .18* .31*** .34*** -.09 -.44*** -.40*** 1.00 
 
* significant at the ten percent level.  
** significant at the five percent level.  
*** significant at the one percent level.
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Table 5 – Results of pooled OLS regression (dependent variable: ln q) 
 
 (1) (1) (2) (2) 
Variable Privatized 
firms 
Publicly 
held firms 
Privatized 
firms 
Publicly 
held firms 
Intercept 1.985*** 
(.484) 
-.025 
(1.163) 
1.902*** 
(.479) 
-.117 
(1.183) 
     
RD / A 1.286 
(.855) 
7.504*** 
(2.451) 
  
RDC / A   .386** 
(.197) 
1.917*** 
(.639) 
I / A 1.113*** 
(.288) 
.695 
(.494) 
1.097*** 
(.286) 
.718 
(.494) 
     
D / A .497*** 
(.180) 
.496 
(.360) 
.489*** 
(.178) 
.596 
(.367) 
ln S 
 
-.133*** 
(.030) 
-.010 
(.064) 
 
-.127*** 
(.030) 
-.010 
(.064) 
 
     
Year 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES 
Country 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES 
     
R
2
 .604 .378 .611 .375 
N. of firms 
N. obs. 
20 
103 
20 
103 
20 
103 
20 
103 
 
* significant at the ten percent level.  
** significant at the five percent level.  
*** significant at the one percent level. 
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Table 6 – Results of fixed- and random-effects regression (dependent variable: ln q) 
 (1) (1) (1) (1) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
Variable Privatized 
firms 
Privatized 
firms 
Publicly 
held firms 
Publicly 
held firms 
Privatized 
firms 
Privatized 
firms 
Publicly 
held firms 
Publicly 
held firms 
 FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Intercept  2.454*** 
(.725) 
 -.176 
(1.341) 
 2.280*** 
(.746) 
 -.303 
(1.358) 
         
RD / A -1.088 
(1.419) 
-.397 
(1.017) 
2.524 
(3.484) 
4.401** 
(2.217) 
    
RDC / A     .313 
(.494) 
.190 
(.300) 
.544 
(1.038) 
1.103* 
(.597) 
I / A 1.179*** 
(.396) 
1.037*** 
(.322) 
.245 
(.582) 
.612 
(.422) 
1.104*** 
(.399) 
.986*** 
(.325) 
.229 
(.592) 
.591 
(.431) 
         
D / A .211 
(.263) 
.270 
(.201) 
.413 
(.441) 
.304 
(.364) 
.206 
(.264) 
.252 
(.202) 
.393 
(.441) 
.310 
(.369) 
ln S 
 
-.203 
(.145) 
-.189*** 
(.048) 
-.291 
(.290) 
 
.041 
(.091) 
 
-.250* 
(.136) 
-.180*** 
(.049) 
-.256 
(.294) 
 
-.034 
(.091) 
 
         
Year 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
R
2
 .898 .330 .825 .253 .897 .342 .824 .236 
σ2ε  .315E-1  .133  .316E-1  .134 
σ2ν  .894E-1  .251  .888E-1  .256 
θ  .555E-1  .814E-1  .560E-1  .803E-1 
Hausman test 
(p-value) 
 
.149  .446  .160  .457 
N. of firms 
N. obs. 
20 
103 
20 
103 
20 
103 
20 
103 
20 
103 
20 
103 
20 
103 
20 
103 
 
* significant at the ten percent level.  
** significant at the five percent level.  
*** significant at the one percent level. 
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Table 7 – Results of 2SLS regression  
  (1) (1) (2) (2) 
  Privatized firms Publicly held firms Privatized firms Publicly held firms 
 Dep. 
Variable 
 
ln q 
 
RD / A 
 
ln q 
 
RD / A 
 
ln q 
 
RDC / A 
 
ln q  
 
RDC / A 
Ind.  
Variables 
         
Constant  2.361*** 
(.534) 
.081* 
(.043) 
-.282 
(1.319) 
-.062 
(.063) 
2.361*** 
(.536) 
.367* 
(.209) 
-.207 
(1.300) 
-.303 
(.245) 
          
RD / A  -.404 
(1.251) 
 8.795** 
(3.965) 
     
RDC / A      .-.094 
(.292) 
 2.027** 
(.914) 
 
I / A  1.151*** 
(.296) 
 .543 
(.616) 
 1.153*** 
(.298) 
 .669 
(.575) 
 
          
D / A  .534*** 
(.185) 
.019 
(.013) 
.523 
(.366) 
-.065*** 
(.023) 
.534*** 
(.186) 
.125** 
(.060) 
.611 
(377) 
-.270*** 
(.090) 
ln S 
 
 -.159*** 
(.034) 
-.005 
(.003) 
-.002 
(.067) 
 
.009** 
(.004) 
-.159*** 
(.034) 
-.022 
(0.014) 
 
-.007 
(.067) 
 
.038** 
(.015) 
ln q   .001 
(.013) 
 .051*** 
(.012) 
 -.030 
(.058) 
 .179*** 
(.048) 
          
RDIND   .316*** 
(.029) 
 .079 
(.069) 
 1.284*** 
(.132) 
 .446* 
(.268) 
          
Year 
dummies 
 YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Country 
dummies 
 YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
          
R
2
 
 
.583 .590 .376 .133 .581 .530 .375 .182 
N. of firms 
N. obs. 
 20 
103 
20 
103 
20 
103 
20 
103 
20 
103 
20 
103 
20 
103 
20 
103 
 
* significant at the ten percent level.  
** significant at the five percent level.  
*** significant at the one percent level. 
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Figure 1 - RD/A ratio (left axis) and Tobin’s q (right axis) for privatized firms (only 13 firms for which 
observations are available for all the years from year 0 to year 3 after privatization)  
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